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JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN CORPORATION
I. INTRODUC0TION
In an action against a foreign corporation, it would often be
advantageous to the plaintiff to bring the suit within his own
state, and the question arises: Does the court have jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation? At least three factors make it dif-
ficult to establish a hard and fast rule as the answer to this ques-
tion: First, jurisdiction in many cases is sustained as a result of
a number of activities, and the courts repeatedly say that juris-
diction depends upon the facts of each case;' second, the appel-
late court will not overrule unless the trial court's determination
is wholly unsupported by the evidence or manifestly influenced
or controlled by error of law;2 and third, since 1945 the test of
service of process has included not only an analysis of the quan-
tum of activities carried on in the state by the corporation but
also a balancing of these in relation to the intangible "fair and
orderly administration of the laws."s The purpose of this note is
to determine what factors will likely govern the law in this
"morass" 4 in light of a South Carolina amendment to the Uni-
form Commercial Coder which goes into effect this year. This
objective will be approached by examining the trend of South
Carolina cases and by looking at what other states have done
with similar statutes.0
II. JURISDIcTION DISTINGUISHED FRO31
TAXING AND DO1i-EESTICATION
This subject is sometimes broadly referred to as "doing busi-
ness". Care should be taken to distinguish corporate "doing
1. E.g., Graybill v. Sims Saddle & Leather Co., 241 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.S.C.
1965); Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508
(1960) ; State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242 (1946) ; Jones
v. General Motors Corp., 197 S.C. 129, 14 S.E.2d 628 (1941).
2. E.g., Lawson v. Jeter, 243 S.C. 103, 132 S.E.2d 276 (1963); State v.
Ford Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E2d 242 (1946); Bass v. American
Prod. Export & Import Corp., 124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E. 594 (1923).
3. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
4. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930).
5. S.C. Cons ANN. § 10.10-101 (1966).
6. For the practitioner there is a booklet, What Constitutes Doing Business,
published by The Corporation Trust Company in 1963 which lists specific ac-
tivities and states whether or not a case sustained or set aside service under
these activities. Cases under most activities go both ways and, as the publication
warns, care should be taken to place a case in chronological perspective in rela-
tionship to International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and to
remember that the problem is a factual determination in most cases.
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business" in the service of process situation from "doing busi-
ness" for domestication or licensing purposes and "doing busi-
ness" for taxation purposes. Basically, the due process test of
whether or not a corporation's activity in a state warrants taxa-
tion depends upon the corporation's "nexus" with the state.7
There also must not be an unreasonable interference with inter-
state commerce, this restriction stemming from the commerce
clause; yet a state tax is permissible even if all the activity of
the corporation is interstate in nature.s Congress reacted to this
situation and prohibited the state from levying a net income tax
on interstate activities when the sole activity was solicitation;"
however, the Supreme Court trend in this area continues to lessen
the restrictions of the United States Constitution on a state's
power to tax.10
"Doing business" for qualification purposes has the most re-
strictive constitutional criteria." Qualification statites also
must meet a commerce clause test; however, if activities within
a state are solely in interstate commerce, the corporation is
immune from qualification requirements.' 2 Activities such as
maintaining a stock of goods in a state,18 installation of equip-
ment of a non-technical nature,14 and rendering the services' 5
have been held intrastate for this purpose; whereas activities
classified as isolated transactions 6 or preliminary acts17 and
specific acts such as participating in a suit, holding corporate
meetings, maintaining bank accounts, maintaining offices or
trustees for securities transfers, creating or collecting debts,
7. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450(1959).
8. McGoldrick v. Bervind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 47 (1940).
9. 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964).
10. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
11. See Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962).
12. Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); International Text-
book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); Crutche v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47
(1891); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-on-Drug, Inc., 366 U.S. 277 (1961) (dictum).
13. E.g., Dalton Adding Mach. Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 498 (1918);
Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U.S. 226 (1906); THE CORPRATON TRUST
Co., WHAT CONSTTUTES DOING BUSINESS 66 (1963).
14. E.g., General Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 500 (1918); Brown-
ing v. Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1914); THE COR'ORATION TRUST Co., WHAT
CONSTITUTES DOING BusiNEss 52 (1963).
15. E.g., Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944); Interstate
Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U.S. 560 (1916); THE CORPORATION TRUST Co.,
WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BusINEss 76 (1963).
16. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-23.1(b) (9) (Supp. 1966).
17. 20 CJ.S. Corporations § 1832 (1940).
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owning and controlling a subsidiary 8 are generally activities
which do not require a corporation to qualify.
Formerly these three types of "doing business" were confused
without any great harm; however, as the inhibitions imposed by
the commerce clause and due process were lessened, each of the
three types developed its own distinctive line of cases.1 9 If today
the much more liberal service of process standard were confused
with qualification, an activity solely in interstate commerce20
could subject a corporation to a myriad of filing requirements 1
or could deny the corporation access to the courts of the state
and impose a fine of as much as ten dollars a day for the period
the corporation did business in the state without qualifying. 22
III. TmE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR JURISDICTION
A. Prseo-ntenationZ Shoe
At common law, jurisdiction could not be obtained over a for-
eign corporation which did not consent to service since the cor-
poration did not legally exist outside of the state in which it was
created.23 The earlier constitutional due process test of jurisdic-
tion was stated in Pennoyer v. Neff :24 "[N]o State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property with-
out its territory."
2 5
This rigid requirement of actual presence was eroded in the
corporate field by various fictions of the courts. A foreign cor-
poration could be sued because of its "implied presence" within a
jurisdiction. 26 Also it was constitutionally permissible to make a
corporation "consent" to service of process if it wished to trans-
act business within the state.27 These exceptions were concerned
with the degree of activity carried on in the state and they asked
18. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-23.1(b) (Supp. 1966).
19. See Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962);
TiE CoRroRATION TRUST Co., WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS 1 (1963).
20. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) ; RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 30 comment c (1942).
21. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. 88 12-23.2, 12-24.1 (Supp. 1966).
22. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-23.15(a), (b) (Supp. 1966).
23. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1202, 1203 (1952) ; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (dictum).
24. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
25. Id. at 721.
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the question: Was the corporation "doing business". 28 In this
era, because of the commerce clause, activity termed "mere
solicitation" did not subject a corporation to jurisdiction of the
state; "solicitation plus" was required.
2 9
B. International Shoe
In 1945 Intenationa Shoe Company v. FVashington0 set forth
a new standard. To meet the requirements of due process with
respect to a corporation not within the state there must be some
"minimum contact with the jurisdiction such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'-"a No longer was the test to be solely
quantitative, asking only what is the degree of activity carried
on within the state by the foreign corporation. The spectrum of
activities that had previously determined whether or not there
was jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, as described by Chief
Justice Stone, ranged from the continuous activities from which
the suit arose to isolated incidents unrelated to the cause of
action. 2 The former, of course, always warranted service against
a corporation; but as the activity within the state became less
and less and the cause of action showed a smaller connection with
this activity, the burden on the corporation exceeded the bounds
of due process. 8 The difficult situations were between the two
ends of the spectrum. 4 In cases in which continuous activities in
a state were substantial, a suit could arise out of unrelated ac-
tivities ;as or a single act, because of its very nature and quality,
could be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to
suit.86 According to Stone, due process now required that these
activities on the spectrum be balanced with the fair and orderly
administration of the law to determine whether or not due proc-
ess was offended.Y7 Therefore an additional factor would be the
28. Id.
29. Green v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). See Shealy v.
Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1962).
30. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
31. Id. at 316.
32. Id. at 317.
33. Id.
34. See Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences as Bases
of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 Iow.A L. REV. 249, 252 (1959).
35. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 319.
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estimate of the inconveniences which would result from the cor-
poration's defending the suit away from its "home." 8
C. The 6onstitutional Limits of Intemational Shoe
Since International 8hoe several cases have shown the extent
to which the Supreme Court has invited the states to break with
the requirement of presence. In McGee v. International Life
Insurance Oompany9 a Texas insurance company assumed the
obligations of an Arizona life insurance company. Among these
obligations was a policy with a California resident. The insur-
ance company contacted the California policy holder and ac-
cepted premiums from him until his death. Although this was
the only activity of the defendant in California, the Court upheld
service made at defendant's home office under a California stat-
ute which subjects foreign corporations to suit in California on
insurance contracts with California residents. The Supreme
Court took note of the expanding scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and explained the trends as being attribut-
able to the transformation of our economy, in which more and
more commercial transactions are being conducted across state
lines by mail, and to modern communications and transportation,
which have lessened the burden of defending a suit in a distant
state where a corporation engages in economic activity.
40
In an earlier case4 ' a Nebraska mail-order health insurance
company had challenged the personal jurisdiction asserted by
Virginia in the issuance of a cease-and-desist order under a Vir-
ginia Blue Sky law. The Supreme Court sustained jurisdiction
and held that solicitation of policies by mail was a sufficient
"minimum contact" to meet the due process requirement. One
factor that seemed to influence the Court was the fact that if
jurisdiction were denied the burden on a Virginia citizen would
be very great because of the expense and trouble of suing in
Nebraska. Moreover, the Court felt that the witnesses were likely
to live in Virginia. Thus the Court seemed to have injected an-
other practical consideration into the constitutional criteria for
service of process.
Although the trend was very liberal, the Supreme Court in
1958 made it clear that all territorial distinctions were not to be
38. Id.
39. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
40. Id. at 223.
41. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
Vol. 19
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eradicated. Hamon v. DenekZa4 2 clarified the meaning of "mini-
mum contact" as set forth in Inte)nationaZ Shoe by stating that
the defendant must have done some act which purposely avails
him of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state. There must be this "minimum contact" with the forum
despite how minimal the burden of defending the suit might be,
and a unilateral act of the plaintiff is not a sufficient "minimum
contact.
4 1
After InternationaZ Shoe many states took advantage of the
growing trend in favor of jurisdiction and enacted "long arm"
statutes which extended their jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. 44 The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the consti-
tutionality of these statutes. In an Opinion of the Justice in
Chambers,45 Justice Goldberg reviewed New York's "long arm"
statute which authorizes personal jurisdiction on the basis of a
tortious act in the state. He expressed the opinion that the New
York statute was constitutional as applied to the defendant who
allegedly entered the state intentionally for the purpose of com-
mitting a tort.
IV. JURISDICTION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. The Statutem
There are several service of process statutes in South Carolina
at present. The general provision for suit against "a corpora-
tion" provides for delivery of a copy of the summons "to the
president or other head of the corporation, or to the secretary,
cashier or treasurer or any director or agent thereof .... -46
When service is made against a foreign corporation, this section
of the code is restricted by statute to cases in which (a) the cor-
poration has property within the state, (b) the cause of action
arose therein or (c) the service is made personally in this state
upon the president, cashier, treasurer, attorney, secretary or any
other agent thereof.47 The South Carolina Supreme Court as
42. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
43. Id. at 253.
44. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33411 (c) (3) (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 110-
17 (1956); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92 (1957); MINN. STAT. § 303.13 (1965);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & Rui § 302 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-145 (1965); TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. art. 2031(b), § 4 (1964); VT. STAT.
ANN. § 12-855 (1958).
45. Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965).
46. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-421 (Supp. 1966).
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10423 (1962).
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late as 1957 has held that two things are required for compliance
with this section: First, the corporation must be doing business
in the state; and second, service must be upon a duly authorized
officer or agent of the company within this state.48
There are two provisions for substituted service upon the Sec-
retary of State. One provides that if the corporation "transacts
business" without complying with the state qualification require-
ments, service upon the Secretary then is deemed sufficient serv-
ice provided proper notice is given to the defendant.49 The other
provision, which was enacted as part of the South Carolina
Business Corporation Act of 1962, states that a foreign corpora-
tion has designated the Secretary of State as its agent by "doing
business" without obtaining authority to do business.50 As a
general rule "doing business" and "transacting business" are
said to be synonymous5" although there is a minority view which
indicates that "transacting business" requires a lesser degree of
activity within a state to sustain jurisdiction.52
B. The South Carolina Supreme Court's Iterpretation
The earlier cases under these service of process statutes were
generally influenced by a restrictive view of due process and of
the commerce clause imposed by the United States Constitution.53
For example, in 1938 a case dismissed service on a foreign cor-
porate vendor which, having sold its goods out of state, delivered
its goods in state in its own trucks. The court felt that the deliv-
ery was unimportant since the goods were not in the state at the
time of sale.5 4 The court expressly stated that service was being
dismissed because of the federal constitutional authorities and
48. Bargesser v. Coleman Co., 230 S.C. 562, 96 S.E.2d 825 (1957).
49. S.C. CODE Aim. § 10-424 (Supp. 1966).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-23.14 (Supp. 1966).
51. E.g., Frye v. Batavia Veterans Administration Employes Fed. Credit
Union, 8 F.R.D. 334, (D.D.C. 1943); Milbank v. Standard Motor Constr.
Co., 156 Cal. App. 67, 22 P.2d 271 (1933) ; Filmakers Releasing Organization
v. Realart Picture, Inc., 374 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. App. 1964).
52. See, e.g., Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564, 567 (N.D.
Ill. 1957); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.
2d 443, 452, 209 N.E.2d 68, 72, 261 N.Y.S2d 8, 14 (1965). The decisions that
feel that there is a difference relate "doing business" to the older line of cases
in which the activity in the state was the sole test of jurisdiction. "Transact-
ing business" expresses the lesser activity necessary for jurisdiction after
International Shoe.
53. See Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962).
54. Zeigler v. Puritan Mills, 188 S.C. 367, 199 S.E. 420 (1938).
[Vol. 19
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not because of the South Carolina statute which the court viewed
as being very broad.
As the restrictions of the United States Constitution were
eased, South Carolina required less activity in the state in order
to sustain jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Immediately
before International Shoe the South Carolina Supreme Court
sustained assumption of jurisdiction over Ford Motor Company
even though Ford had gone to considerable lengths to avoid any
contact with the state in its franchise agreements.rr This case
was later reaffirmed using the "minimum contact" language of
International Shoe.56
These later cases seemed to indicate the full acceptance of
"minimum contact" with all its constitutional potential; however,
there appeared to be a period of regression from the earlier more
liberal standard. In Hoffman v. D. Landreth Seed Companyr7
the defendant solicited orders in South Carolina through a trav-
eling "solicitor" (not salesman). The orders were to be accepted
outside the state and the goods were to be shipped in interstate
commerce. The defendant also sent a representative into the state
to investigate any complaints. The court denied jurisdiction,
pointing out the limitation by federal authorities because of the
due process, equal protection and interstate commerce problems
involved and because the trial court's determination was not to be
disturbed unless wholly unsupported by the evidence. In an-
other case a year earlier the court affirmed the trial court's
determination that there was no jurisdiction, relying on the fact
that defendant sold only in interstate commerce. 58
But then in 1958 South Carolina had a case similar to the
Supreme Court case of McGee v. International Life ln'urance
Company,59 and the court sustained jurisdiction.6 0 Then in 1960
a Florida dredging corporation, which had its crew based in
Georgia and procured its supplies solely from Georgia and
55. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 200 S.C. 393, 21 S.E.2d 34 (1942).
56. State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242 (1946). This case
shows how early South Carolina recognized the distinction between service of
process and domestication situations. In this case Ford was not required to
domesticate despite the fact that it had earlier been held to be amenable to
service in Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 200 S.C. 393, 21 S.E.2d 34 (1942).
57. 220 S.C. 193, 66 S.E2d 813 (1951).
58. Industrial Equip. Co. v. Frank G. Hough Co., 218 S.C. 169, 61 S.E.2d
884 (1950).
59. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
60. Ross v. American Income Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 433, 102 S.E.2d 743
(1958). In this case the court sustained jurisdiction pursuant to S.C. CoDE
ANN. § 37-265 (1962).
8
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Florida sources, was denied a motion to set aside service for a
tort committed in South Carolina."' The court used the "mini-
mum contact" language of International Shoe and felt that the
test was met by the corporation's ten months of dredging activi-
ties in the Savannah River which occasionally required cutting
into the banks of South Carolina.
Recently the South Carolina Supreme Court removed any
doubt that it would attempt to go to the full limits permitted
by the federal authorities. In Carolina Boats c Plastics v. Glas-
coat Distributors, Inc. 62 the court pointed out that the ideas
expressed in the Hoffman and Zeigler cases had been supplanted
by a new test of jurisdiction which required "only that the cor-
poration have such contact with the state of the forum that the
maintenance of an action against it in personam should not
'offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.' " Borrowing again from the United States Supreme
Court cases, the court stated that the factors which govern juris-
diction in South Carolina now are:
(a) duration and nature of the corporate activity within the
state,
(b) the character of the acts giving rise to the litigation,
(c) the circumstances of their commission, and
(d) the relative inconvenience to the respective parties of a
trial in the state of the forum on the one hand and in the state
of corporate domicile on the other.
V. The Fourth Uihcuit's Interpretation of South Carolina's
Statutes
A suit in federal court may be commenced against a foreign
corporation by service of process in the manner prescribed by
the state law in which service is made. 64 When this procedure is
used, the Fourth Circuit has held that it is bound by South
Carolina's interpretation of its service of process procedure;65
therefore, its handling of these statutes is of some importance.
61. Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960).
62. 249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967).
63. Id. at 53, 152 S.E.2d at 353.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7).
65. E.g., Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962);
Bramlett v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (D.S.C. 1966).
Care should be taken not to apply this literally in every situation. If state
9
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In Springs Cotton Mills v. Machinecraft, Inc.,6" a case arising
before Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Company,"7 the district
court held that when a Massachusetts corporation had sold
through its exclusive distributor some allegedly defective textile
machinery to a South Carolina corporation, International Shoe
should be confined to its facts, and service was quashed. This
case should, however, be compared to a later district court case
in which the defendant'also tried to confine International oe
to its facts. In the latter case the defendant was met with this
quotation:
No two cases are alike. The value of constitutional pre-
cedent is not merely to guide a decision on like facts. Their
value is also in the exposition of legal principles to be
applied to the facts which, though different, rationally call
for application of the principles which have been ex-
posited.68
Another reason why the authority of Machinecraft should be
limited is the fact that the court felt there was no South Caro-
lina authority which would compel use of a "minimal connec-
tion" test. At the time this case was decided the most current
South Carolina Supreme Court case in this area was the now-
repudiated case of Hoffman v. D. Landreth Seed Company.69
Following Boney the federal courts regarded South Caro-
lina's interpretation of her service of process statutes as being
very broad. In Shealy v. Challenger Manufacturing Company70
a Tennessee manufacturer's primary activity in the state was the
delivery of its products in its own trucks to a local wholesaler
for resale in the state. The Fourth Circuit, in sustaining juris-
diction, reviewed the federal and South Carolina decisions and
concluded that the South Carolina service of process statutes
"approach, if they do not reach, ultimate constitutional
bounds.
171
law exceeded the due process clause, the federal court could not be bound.
Cf. Charles Keeshin, Inc. v. Gordon Johnson Co., 109 F. Supp. 939 (W.D.
Ark. 1952). See Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1103 (1966), which concludes that when
the state standard for jurisdiction is more restrictive than the federal standard,
state law should apply. But see Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60
(4th Cir. 1965).
66. 156 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.S.C. 1957).
67. 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960).
68. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393, 403 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd
349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
69. 220 S.C. 193, 66 S.E2d 813 (1951).
70. 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962).
71. Id. at 107.
10
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During this time there were numerous district court cases in
which jurisdiction was sustained, relying upon Shealy and In-
ternational Shoe. One case used the traditional method of
analyzing the volume of business done in the state and upheld
service upon the foreign corporation.72 A number of district
court cases have sustained jurisdiction, using "minimum con-
tact" language, because of extensive franchise agreements be-
tween the foreign corporation and dealers in the state.7T In one
of these cases the cause of action arose outside the state.74 While
the court had the support of a very early South Carolina case
which held this was permissible,"5 it was not until 1952 that the
United States Supreme Court expressly held that it was constitu-
tional to sustain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for a
cause of action arising outside the forum state.76
A number of district court cases, however, demonstrate that
jurisdiction will not be sustained in every case. Evidence of a
delivery of one automobile was insufficient to make a North
Carolina corporation amenable to suit,77 and the filling of an
unsolicited order for a crane by a California corporation did not
meet the standards of Shealy, Intenational Shoe, the South
Carolina Supreme Court or the statutes for service.78 One case70
casts serious doubts as to whether the district courts will apply in
every case the sweeping language of Shealy. The suit was brought
to restrain the defendant from prosecuting a cause of action in
Surinam, South America, arising out of a contract for an ex-
clusive selling agency in South Carolina. Part of the negotiation
and execution of the contract took place in South Carolina, but
the court concluded that under the terms of the contract sub-
stantially all of the performance was to take place in South
America. Also, the defendant had had representatives solicit
72. Graybill v. Sims Saddle & Leather Co., 241 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.S.C.
1965). Over 150 sale orders had been taken in the state by traveling repre-
sentatives.
73. Rodrique v. Yale & Towne, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 73 (D.S.C. 1966) ; Bram-
lett v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 1011 (D.S.C. 1966) (plaintiff was
suing for $7,217.00 worth of dancing lessons) ; Hughes v. Kaiser Jeep Corp.,
246 F. Supp. 557 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F.
Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C.), afrd, 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
74. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C.), afj'd, 349
F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
75. Lipe v. Carolina C. & 0. Ry., 123 S.C. 515, 116 S.E. 101 (1923).
76. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
77. Bolton v. Fair Bluff Motors, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
78. Clawson v. Garland, 37 F.R.D. 324 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
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orders from two South Carolina firms. The court held there was
no jurisdiction, feeling that the guide lines of Shealy were not
applicable. If the cause of action is viewed as not being concerned
with the contract, then the contacts of the defendant within the
state should be greater in order to sustain jurisdiction.80 It could
be argued in this case, however, that the cause of action was based
on the contract which was partially executed in this state and
concerned an exclusive selling agency in this state. Yet no men-
tion was made of McGee which held that a single contract was
sufficient to meet the "minimum contact" requirement of due
process if the cause of action arose therefrom.
Thus it can be seen that the federal courts, viewing the South
Carolina law up to the time of Boney, sustained jurisdiction in
a large number of cases using very broad language from Inter-
national Shoe; but in at least one instance the court did not
extend jurisdiction in a case which conceivably could have met
the due process requirements.
V. TiE SouT CAROLINA AmiNDniNT TO THE
UNFORM CoMMRcIA CODE
A. Introduction
In 1965 the South Carolina court, relying upon the South
Carolina statutes without any reference to constitutional prob-
lems, set aside service on a defendant which had manufactured
a coffee brewer that had passed through the channels of trade
and had injured a South Carolina plaintiff."' It has been sug-
gested that this could be a situation in which jurisdiction could
be limited by South Carolina's service of process statute rather
than by the United States Constitution. 2
Any possibility that the South Carolina Legislature intended a
restrictive statute was removed when the General Assembly of
South Carolina added a "long-arm" provision to the Uniform
Commercial Code. The language is taken from some of the more
liberal statutes that were passed by other states after Interna-
tional Shoe.88
80. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 324 U.S. 437 (1952).
81. Phillips v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 245 S.C. 383, 140 S.E.2d 786 (1965).
82. See Comment, 17 S.C.L. Ray. 445 (1965).
83. E.g., ILL ANN. STAT. § 110-17 (1956); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAw & RULE
§ 302 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1965).
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B. The State Constitutionality of the Amendment
There is a possibility that this new provision may violate the
state constitution, which requires that "every Act . . . shall
relate to but one subject and that shall be expressed in the
title.18 4 Among other things the Uniform Commercial Code
extends jurisdiction over persons with certain enduring rela-
tionships "to any cause of action,"8 15 and, in another section bases
personal jurisdiction on "transacting any business . . .commis-
sion of a tortious act ... causing tortious injury or death .. .
or having an interest in, using or possessing real property .... -18
Arguably, some of these topics are not expressed in the title of
the Act87 nor are they germane to the other provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code. This section of the state constitution
is liberally construed 8 and a statute is upheld whenever pos-
sible, 9 so perhaps the constitutionality could be saved. A re-
enactment,90 however, could remove any doubt of constitution-
ality.
0. The Single-Tort Acts
Possibly the new UCC provision could cover a situation simi-
lar to the facts in Phillips v. Knapp-Monarh Company,9 ' in
which a South Carolina resident was injured inside the state by
goods which were manufactured by a foreign corporation outside
the state. In the Illinois case of Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corporation,92 a defective water heater manu-
factured outside the state exploded and injured an Illinois resi-
dent. The Illinois court sustained jurisdiction under a statute
which provided for service when a person commits a tortious act
or omission within the state.08 The court reasoned that the tort
84. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 17.
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-802 (1966).
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803 (1966).
87. "To Be Known As The Uniform Commercial Code, Relating To Cer-
tain Commercial Transactions In Or Regarding Personal Property And Con-
tracts And Other Documents Concerning Them, Including . " LIV S.C.
STATS. AT LARGE 4027 (No. 1065, 1966).
88. McKiever v. City of Sumter, 137 S.C. 266, 135 S.E. 60 (1926); Southern
Power Co. v. Walker, 89 S.C. 84, 71 S.E. 356 (1911); Hill v. City Council,
59 S.C. 396, 38 S.E. 11 (1901) ; Floyd v. Perrin, 30 S.C. 1, 8 S.E. 14 (1888).
89. Alley v. Daniel, 153 S.C. 217, 150 S.E. 691 (1929).
90. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129,
103 S.E.2d 908 (1958).
91. 245 S.C. 383, 140 S.E.2d 786 (1965).
92. 22 I1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1957).
93. ILL. ANN. STAT. § 110-17 (1956).
[Vol. 19
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was committed at the place where the injury occurred and not
where the water heater was manufactured, and therefore the
language of the statute was met. The current constitutional
authorities were discussed and it was felt that "minimum con-
tact" had been satisfied.
The theory of the Gray case, however, has not been without its
critics. A Pennsylvania case has held that only by a distortion of
the language employed by the legislature "can acts or omissions"
be equated with "where the injury arose" or "where right of
cause of action arose." 94 A New York court felt that the Illinois
court had confused the place of "commission of a tortious act"
with "place of wrong" in the conflicts of law area, and it also
pointed out that the place of a "tort" was not necessarily the
place of the "tortious act."95
The Minnesota statute uses the words "commits a tort in
whole or in part in [the state]," 96 and the Minnesota court has
had little trouble in holding that an injured citizen may obtain
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which never entered the
state.9 7 The first appellate decision9" that squarely held that
jurisdiction may be acquired by a single tort 9 also had the
benefit of a statute that used the words "commits a tort in whole
or in part in [the state]."100 In that case the defendant had
come into the state and had committed the tort; but when faced
with the situation where only the injury occurred inside the
state, the Vermont court refused to extend jurisdiction under
the statute. 0 1 The South Carolina Act does not use the broader
language "commission of a tort" as do the Vermont and Minne-
sota statutes nor is it limited to the words "commission of a
tortious act or tortious conduct within this state," which the
majority of cases hold should not apply to a product defectively
94. Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405 Pa. 123, 173 A.2d 123 (1961).
95. Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
96. MINN. STAT. § 303.13 (1965).
97. Cf. Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn.
56. 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963) ; Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn.
571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
98. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664
(1951).
99. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1202, 1205 (1952).
100. VT. STAT. ANN. § 12-855 (1958).
101. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
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manufactured outside the state.102 Thus the South Carolina
court could adopt either view.
While it is not clear from the language which way the South
Carolina court could interpret the single tortious act provision
when faced with a situation in which a product manufactured
outside the state injures a resident, two other provisions may be
applied under these circumstances. These provisions 03 spell out
activity that a manufacturer, whose product might injure a per-
son in the state, would be likely to conduct. Also these provi-
sions come closer to meeting the constitutional caveat expressed
in Hansen v. Denckla'0 4 and IternationaZ Shoe'°5 that a defend-
ant must have done some act by which he purposely avails him-
self of the privilege of conducting activity within the forum
state. Arguably the court either will have to infer that the
defendant's products have substantial use and consumption in
the state as was done in Gray0 6 or will at least have to find
some reasonable expectation by the defendant that the goods
were to be used in the state in order to meet the due process test
under these new sections. 10 7 This may not be too burdensome
since it has been held that a reasonable expectation of use within
a state may be the anticipation of a national market which does
not specifically exclude the state in question. 08
D. Other Activities
Other activities'0 0 in the new UCC provision which subject a
foreign corporation to suit in South Carolina if the cause of
102. "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's...
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this state . .. .
S.C. CODE AxN. § 10.2-803(1)(c) (1966).
103. (d) causing tortious injury or death in this State by an act or omission
outside this State if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state ....
(h) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the reason-
able expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this
State and are so used or consumed.
S.C. CODE AwN. §§ 10.2-803(1) (d), (h) (1966).
104. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
105. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
106. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1957); see O'Brien v. Comstock
Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568, 571 (1963).
107. See Comment, 50 MiNN. L. R-v. 946, 951 (1966).
108. Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56,
124 N.W.2d 824 (1963).
109. (a) transacting any business in this State;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in this State ...
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action arose therefrom probably could have been construed judi-
cially to be "doing business" or "transacting business" under the
old service of process sections.110 In fact, "transacting business"
is stated as one of these activities"1 ' apparently to take advan-
tage of the new methods of service by personal delivery or mail
or under other state laws or court direction. 1 2 The provision
that sustains jurisdiction if the cause of action arose out of a
contract to be performed in the state may have a strong consti-
tutional base in McGee v. International Life Insuranve Com-
pany' 3 since it has been held that the constitutional worth of
this case should not be limited solely to insurance contracts.
114
There is, however, authority to the contrary.115
A provision which might have constitutional difficulty both
under the state constitution and Federal Constitution is the pro-
vision basing personal jurisdiction on a cause of action arising
out of having an interest in, using, or possessing real property
in the state.116 Although Pennoyer v. Neff has been severely
limited by International Shoe and by later cases, it has not been
expressly overruled by the United States Supreme Court, and
it may be argued that this situation runs counter to one of the
principles established in Pennoyer--"a court has no jurisdiction
to render a personal judgment against a nonresident defendant
merely because he owns property within the forum."11 7 There is
serious doubt that any court would hold that owning property in
a state is not a sufficient "minimum contact," especially when the
cause of action was related to the property; yet this brings out
the related problem of whether or not state and district court
cases decided before InternationaZ Shoe have any authority. At
least one South Carolina District Court case has discounted cases
cited because they were decided before Internationa Shoe.118
(f) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
State at the time of contracting;
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in this State ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803(1) (a), (b), (e), (f), (g) (1966).
110. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 10-424, 12-23.14 (Supp. 1966). These sections are
unaffected by the new provision. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-809 (1966).
111. S.C. CODE ANN. § 102-803(1)(a) (1966).
112. Id. § 10.2-806.
113. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
114. Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D.
Minn. 1965); see Comment, 50 MINN. L. REv. 946, 959 (1966).
115. Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803(1) (e) (1966).
117. Annot., 2 L.Ed.2d 1664 (1958).
118. Bramlett v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 1011 (D.S.C. 1966).
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VI. CoNCLusION
As stated above, the tendency of the South Carolina courts
and legislature has been to expand jurisdiction as far as consti-
tutionally possible. Under the new UCC, jurisdiction may be
extended to cases arising in the products liability area or arising
out of a single contract connected with the state. These situa-
tions are at the outer limits of constitutionality.
In other situations the South Carolina Supreme Court has
already demonstrated a desire to have the trial court judge fol-
low the guide lines suggested by the United States Supreme
Court when determining due process. Not only should the quan-
tity of the foreign corporation's activity in the state be analyzed,
but also the nature of the acts giving rise to the cause of action,
their relationship to the activities of the corporation, and the
convenience of the parties and witnesses119 should be considered.
WILLT4i S. ELDm
119. When jurisdiction is asserted pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-803,
subsection two denies the use of the venue section, S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-310(3),
which gives the court the discretion to change the place of trial when the con-
venience of witnesses and the ends of justice are promoted.
[Vol. 19
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